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"POLITICAL" BLACKLISTING IN THE MOTION
PICTURE INDUSTRY: A SHERMAN ACT VIOLATION
FOLLOWING an investigation of Hollywood, begun in 1947 by the House
Committee on Un-American Activities to determine the prevalence of Com-
munism in the motion picture industry,' eight writers, a writer-producer, and
a director, later known as the "Unfriendly Ten" or "Hollywood Ten," were
convicted of contempt of Congress for refusing to testify.2 In the fall of 1947,
members of the Motion Picture Association of America, the Association of
Motion Picture Producers, and the Society of Independent Motion Picture
Producers met in the Waldorf-Astoria in New York City, and publicly pledged
that the industry would refuse to hire "subversives." 3 Several motion picture
executives initially opposed this 'Waldorf Declaration," but ultimately suc-
cumbed to pressures from Eric Johnston, president of the Association of
Motion Picture Producers, and others present at the meeting.4 As a result of
this declaration, the Hollywood blacklist developed, eventually expanding to
include not only those involved in the congressional investigations, but also
those whose activities were deemed subversive by the industry.r Despite the
1. Hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on Communit
Infiltration of the Motion-Picture Industry in the United States, 80th Cong, 1st Sess.
(1947). 1 CoGI.=, REPORT ON BLACKMSTING 1-24 (1956).
2. Lawson v. United States, 176 F2d 49, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
934 (1950).
3. This pledge, known as the 'WValdorf Declaration," says in part:
We will forthwith discharge or suspend without compensation those in our
employ and we will not re-employ any of the 10 until such time as he... has
purged himself of contempt and declares under oath that he is not a Communist.
We will not knowingly employ a Communist or a member of any party or group
which advocates the overthrow of the government of the United States by force
or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods ...
N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1947, p. 27, col 2. See also 1 CoGLaE, REPOar ON Br.cnusrnGc
22-23 (1956) for complete texL
4. Cole v. Loew's, Inc., 8 F.1D. 508, 524 (S.D. Cal. 1948); 1 CoGLEY, REPOa or.
BLAcKLSTmG 17 (1956).
5. See generally 1 COa=, REPoar ON BLACKLSTING (1956) ; ScauLAcH, THE FA cE
ON THE CUTrING Room FLOOR 122 (1964). The story of Louis Pollock, once a successful
Hollywood writer, illustrates how the blacklist operated. Because of a similarity in names,
Pollock was mistaken for a clothier who had refused to testify before HUAC. He was
blacklisted and the producers uniformly refused to accept his scripts. Since he was unable
to ascertain the reason why his scripts were rejected, he could not clear himself, and thus
was forced out of the industry. Id. at 122-23. See Washington Post, Aug. 25, 1964, edito-
rial page, col 2; N.Y. Times, Aug. 25,1964, p. 33, cols. 2 & 3.
The industry-wide boycott was extended in 1952 to the Independent Productions Corp.,
formed in part by some of the "blacklistees:' That corporation alleged that the motion
picture industry had interfered with the production, distribution, and exhibition of its film
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continued insistence by members of the industry that there has been no con-
certed effort to maintain a uniform list, the similarity between the lists main-
tained by each studio has led one commentator to the conclusion that they
could "have been produced on a single mimeograph machine." Since the major
film companies control the distribution of not only their own films, but also the
films of independent producers,7 the blacklist, as an outgrowth of the Waldorf
Declaration, exacts conformity of conduct among the producers, and effectively
bars the listed actors and writers from the entire motion picture industry. In
the eighteen years since the Waldorf Declaration several legal attempts have
"Salt of the Earth." Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.
N.Y. 1958).
In June, 1960, each of the producers entered agreements with the Screen Writers' Guild
under which a writer could be denied credit only if the producer was unaware of the
writer's blacklisted status: these agreements had the effect of terminating the black market
through which the blacklisted writers had previously sold their scripts. On November 4,
1960 Eric Johnston re-enunciated "the policy of the MPAA member companies in regard
to the hiring of Communists in the creation of motion pictures," emphasizing that the
MPAA member companies were to "ask their associates to adhere to this policy." See
Brief for Appellants, pp. 9-11, and Reply Brief for Appellants, pp. 6-7, Young v. Motion
Picture Ass'n of America, Inc., 299 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
6. Sclutn.AcH, TEE FAcE ON THE CUTTING Room FLOOR 120 (1964). The trouble-
some question of what constitutes sufficient proof of an antitrust conspiracy, or group
action amounting to a boycott, is beyond the scope of this Note. For discussions of this
problem, see Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199
(3d Cir. 1961) ; Turner, The Definition of Agreement tnder the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV. 655 (1962); Conant, Consciously
Parallel Action in Restraint of Trade, 38 MINN. L. REv. 797 (1954); Rahl, Conspiracy
and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REv. 743 (1950); ATTORNEY GENERAL NAT's. CoMM.
ANTITRUST REP. 30-42 (1955). But it seems clear that in the "Hollywood Ten" situation
the evidence would support a finding of conspiracy and combination.
7. The motion picture industry consists of three distinct divisions - production, dis-
tribution, and exhibition. Films are produced by eight major concerns - Columbia,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Paramount, RKO Radio (presently inactive), Twentieth Century-
Fox, United Artists, Universal, and Warner Brothers - and by a large number of in-
dependent producers. Since these eight concerns own or control their own distribution
facilities and control nearly all of the nation-wide distributing facilities, the independent
producers' access to the exhibitors must be through the major concerns. Distribution-
financing agreements are generally made in advance of production, and contain certain
"employment controls" which give the major concerns complete veto power over the in-
dependents' hiring policies. The Motion Picture Association has admitted that such "con-
trols" exist and has defended them as necessary to protect the companies' investments.
Brief for Appellants, p. 4 n.7, Young v. Motion Picture Ass'n, Inc., 299 F.2d 119 (D.C.
Cir. 1962). See also Cassady, Impact of the Paramount Decision on Motion Picture Dis-
tribution and Price Making, 31 So. CAL. L. REv. 150 (1958).
Today, none of the "blacklistees" can be hired by any of the major movie concerns
except United Artists. Nor, except in the rare case of an independent producer as power-
ful as Otto Preminger, can any independent hire without being subject to veto by the large
producer-distributors. Interview with Counsel for Plaintiffs, Young v. Motion Picture
Ass'n, Washington, D.C., March 30, 1964. "[T]he blacklist ...is very much alive in
1964... ." ScHumACH, THE FAcE ON THE CUTTING Room FLOOR 129 (1964).
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been made to avoid the effect of the blacklist,8 but only one case 0 has squarely
challenged its legality as a group boycott under the Sherman Act? 0
In Young v. Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.," plaintiffs, some
of whom were among the original Hollywood Ten, filed suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that the Waldorf
Declaration and the ensuing refusal to hire constitute a combination and con-
spiracy in restraint of trade and in violation of the Sherman Act. Although the
case has been heard several times on procedural questions, the merits of plain-
tiff's contention have not yet been reached.12 Defendants, however, have joined
issue on the merits in their answer. They contend that even assuming a con-
certed refusal to hire, such a refusal does not come within the scope of the
Sherman Act ban on group boycotts, as defined most recently by the Supreme
Court in Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC,1 and Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 4 In the alternative, the producers argue
that a boycott otherwise within the scope of the Sherman Act may be legal
when directed to the achievement of valid social, moral, and political goals.15
In Fashion Originators' Guild "I the Court held illegal a refusal by manu-
facturers to sell to retailers who dealt in garments manufactured by "style
pirates." Justice Black, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated that:
8. See, e.g, Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 240 F.2d 87 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 939 (1957); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844 (9th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 944 (1955); Cole v. Loew's, Inc., 8 F.R.D. 503 (S.D.
Cal. 1948), rev'd, 185 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1950); RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. v. Jarrico, 128
Cal. App. 2d 172, 274 P.2d 928 -(-1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 928 (1955) (all actions for
breach of contract); Wilson v. Loew's, Ipc4 142 C. App. 2d 183, 298 P.2d 152 (Dist Ct.
App. 1956), petition for cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 590 (1958) (tort action alleging malicious
interference with the pursuit of an occupation by means of the blacklist). In none of these
attempts to avoid the effects of the blacklist were the plaintiffs successful; several cases
were settled out of court prior to final determination on the merits.
9. Young v. Motion Picture Ass'n, Inc., 299 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
10. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
An action alleging that as a result of a conspiracy on the part of the industry, the
Hollywood Ten were unemployable, was dismissed by the plaintiffs. Maltz v. Loew's, Inc.,
Civil No. 9717 BH, S.D. Cal., May, 1949; see Horowitz, Loyalty Tests for Employment
in the Motion Picture Industry, 6 STrAx. L. REv. 438, 446-47 (1954). An action brought
under the Sherman Act, in which plaintiff corporation alleged a conspiracy to prevent and
interfere with the production, distribution, and exhibition of its film, has not yet come to
trial. Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
11. 299 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
12. A motion brought under Rule 30(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
preclude inquiry as to the plaintiffs' political associations or beliefs on depositions taken
by defendants was denied. 28 F.R.D. 2 (D.D.C. 1961). The denial by the district court
of a motion for a preliminary injunction was upheld by the court of appeals, without
going into the merits of the cause of action. 299 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
13. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
14. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
15. See Reply Brief for Appellants, pp. 1-2, Young v. Motion Picture Ass'n, Inc., 299
F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
16. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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the purpose and object of this combination, its potential power, its tend-
ency to monopoly, the coercion it could and did practice upon a rival
method of competition, all brought it within the policy of the prohibition
declared by the Sherman and Clayton Acts.1
7
It is not clear, however, whether concerted action alone was the basis for the
Court's holding, or whether it was essential to a finding of illegality that the
boycott be directed against competitors and productive of monopoly.
It can be argued that the second and narrower reading of Fashion Origina-
tors' Guild was endorsed by the Court, again speaking unanimously through
Justice Black, in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.18 In that case,
manufacturers of electrical appliances were alleged to have combined with each
other and with Broadway-Hale, a retail dealer and competitor of KIor's, to
refuse to supply Kor's with appliances. The Court, in holding this an illegal
boycott, spoke of the "monopolistic tendency" of the combination, and also
referred to "group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other
traders."'1 In the context of the opinion, "traders" might be read as meaning
"competitors." While these two elements - tendency to monopoly and direc-
tion against competitors - may have been present in Fashion Originators'
Guild and Kior's, and arguably were necessary to a finding of illegality, they
are clearly absent in the Hollywood Ten boycott. Despite the oligopolistic
structure of the motion picture industry,2 0 the blacklist itself adds nothing to
the economic power of the major concerns, since those boycotted are not in
competition with the members of the combination. Thus the motion picture
industry's distinguishing of the Hollywood blacklist from the boycotts con-
demned in Fashion Originators' Guild and Klor's is not entirely implausible.
An equally reasonable reading of those two cases, however, suggests the
opposite interpretation. Thus, in Fashion Originators' Guild, although the
Court asserted the presence of a tendency toward monopoly, no attempt was
made to support this assertion by economic analysis. Justice Black's enumeration
of the factors found in the Fashion Originators' Guild boycott,21 moreover, is as
consistent with the interpretation that each of them individually would have
been sufficient for a finding of illegality, as with the opposite interpretation
that all must be present for a boycott to be illegal. Similarly, in Klor's, the
reference to "trader" may be talcen as including not only a competitor, but
anyone within the industry, regardless of his relationship to the boycotters.
In fact, while instigated by a competing retailer, the boycott against Kor's
was actually conducted by its suppliers. 22 And the Court's assertion that the
17. Id. at 467-68.
18. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
19. Id. at 212.
20. See note 7 mipra.
21. See quotation accompanying note 17 supra.
22. It is worth noting that the suppliers held liable in the Kor's boycott, like the
motion picture producers in the Hollywood blacklist case, did not derive any economic
benefit from their action.
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boycott tended toward monopoly 23 is vitiated by the lower court's finding that
the number of appliance dealers in the area had increased since the occurrence
of the alleged violatiom24 The Court actually places less emphasis on the
monopolistic tendency of the combination than on its restrictive effect on the
freedom of both the victim and the boycotters-
In sum, Fashion Originators' Guild and Klor's are susceptible to divergent
interpretations and are thus of limited value in predicting the legality of the
Hollywood boycott. Viewed in the context of previous Supreme Court de-
cisions on boycotts, and in the general framework of Sherman Act policy,
however, the broader reading of Fashion Originators' Guild and Klor's emerges
as the more reasonable one, and the Hollywood blacklist seems dearly illegal.
The earlier boycott cases decided under the Sherman Act, unlike the opinions
in Fashion Originators' Guild and Klor's, do not seem to consider the monop-
olistic effect of a boycott important to its illegality, but emphasize instead the
combination itself. In Eastern States Retail Lumber Dcalcrs' Association v.
United States,-6 for example, the Court held illegal a retail-sponsored black-
list of wholesalers who sold directly to the public in competition with local
retailers, stressing that such a refusal to deal, though lawful when done by
one, is an antitrust violation when done by several acting in concert. As the
Court stated in a later case, "the illegality consists, not in the separate action
of each, but in the conspiracy and combination of all to prevent any of them
from dealing with the [victim]. ' *7 These earlier cases, then, demonstrate a
concern more for the restrictive nature of the agreement on the boycotters
than for its effect on the victim, and indicate that the boycotts involved were
condemned for their use as tools in manipulating the forces of the market,
23. [The boycott] dearly has, by its "nature and character," a "monopolistic tend-
ency!' As such it is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one mer-
chant whose business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the
economy. Monopoly can as surely thrive by the elimination of such small business-
men, one at a time, as it can by driving them out in large groups. In recognition of
this fact the Sherman Act has consistently been read to forbid all contracts and
combinations "which 'tend to create a monopoly,"' whether "the tendency is a creep-
ing one! or "one that proceeds at full gallop!'
359 U.S. at 213-14. Accord, Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364
U.S. 656, 660 (1961).
24. Yor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 255 F2d 214, 223-24, 234 (1958).
25. This combination takes from Klor's its freedom to buy appliances in an open com-
petitive market and drives it out of business as a dealer in the defendants' products.
It deprives the maiufacturers and distributors of their freedom to sell to Kior's at
the same prices and conditions made available to Broadway-Hale and in some in-
stances forbids them from selling to it on any terms whatsoever.
359 U.S. at 213 (emphasis added).
26. 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
27. Binderup v. Pathe Exch., Inc., 263 U.S. 291, 312 (1923). Accord, Paramount
Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 41 (1930); United States v. First
Nat'1 Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930).
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regardless of whether such manipulation created a monopoly.28 As a result,
the cases did not confine illegal boycotts to those against competitors. In one
case, for example, a large motion picture exhibitor, blacklisted by a Film
Board of Trade (whose membership consisted of distributors) for dealing with
some of its members and not with others, prevailed on a boycott theory. 0
Anderson v. Shipowners' Association 30 is a case even more closely analogous
to the Hollywood blacklisting situation, since it involved a combination to
control employment. The members of the association agreed to control the
terms of employment of all seamen on their vessels, and prevented those sea-
men who failed to comply from obtaining any employment in the industry.
The Court, condemning the boycott because of its restrictive effect on the free-
dom of shipowners to hire whom they pleased, did not distinguish this boy-
cott from one against competitors. 3' These earlier cases seem to retain their
vitality in light of the fact that the Court in both Fashion Originators' Guild
and Klor's cited them with approval, 82 and did not clearly limit the category
of illegal boycotts to those directed against competitors and monopolistic in
effect.m Moreover, as recently as 1957, in Radovich v. National Football
League,34 the Court seemed to assume that a concerted refusal to hire was
within the prohibition of the Sherman Act.mr From this case and the earlier
boycott cases, it appears that the Hollywood blacklist comes within the pur-
28. Cf. one commentator's suggestion that pressure brought to bear by a concerted
refusal to deal, "where it is applied by persons in the same class as the one offended but
who themselves have no direct cause of grievance against the offender," is condemned by
the courts as an illegal restraint because "such conduct is not a normal course of events."
Kirkpatrick, Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Sherman Act, 10 Gro.
WASH. L. Rnv. 302, 309 (1942).
29. Binderup v. Pathe Exch., Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923).
30. 272 U.S. 359 (1926).
31. [E]ach shipowner and operator in this widespread combination has surrendered
his freedom of action in the matter of employing seamen and agreed to abide by the
will of the associations .... These shipowners and operators having thus put them-
selves into a situation of restraint upon their freedom to carry on interstate and
foreign commerce according to their own choice and discretion, it follows ... that
the combination is in violation of the Anti-Trust Act.
272 U.S. at 364-65. But cf. Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1957).
32. 312 U.S. at 465 (Eastern States); 359 U.S. at 211-12 (Eastern States and Binder-
up).
33. Contra, Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 127 F. Supp. 286 (S.D.
N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 225 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1955), with dictum to the effect that a boycott
itself is not condemned, but it is condemned when the purpose or necessary result of con-
certed action is a tendency toward the creation of a monopoly.
34. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
35. Radovich, who was blacklisted by a professional football league and thus unable
to obtain employment with any affiliated club because he had previously broken a contract
with a member club in order to play for a rival football league, alleged that he was
damaged as a result of this concerted refusal to hire in violation of the Sherman Act. On
a motion to dismiss, the Court held that the complaint stated a good cause of action,
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view of the Sherman Act, despite the fact that its structure is not identical to
the boycotts condemned in Fashion Originators' Guild and Klor's.
Support for this proposition can be derived from an analysis of the history
of the Sherman Act and the policies Congress and the Courts have sought to
promote by it. Although the debates on the Sherman Act were largely con-
cerned with the problem of controlling powerful "trusts,"30 the attempt to
confine its scope solely to "trusts" was frustrated shortly after its enactment37
Rather than treating the act as essentially proscriptive, the courts have applied
it as a "charter of freedom ' 3s to promote and foster competition.1m Imputing
to the framers the fear that those who were to be coerced by the forces of the
free market to serve the public would by combination and conspiracy succeed
in diverting those forces to their own ends,4 0 the courts have applied the act
not only to monopolies but to any practice restraining competition. It is un-
doubtedly on this basis that boycotts have been consistently condemned.
Whether the relationship between the boycotters and their victim is that of
competitor, manufacturer-retailer, or employer-employee, the effect is the
same: the boycotters have arrogated to themselves the power to decide which
services or products the public was to receive. In addition to treating the act
as a positive instrument of economic policy, the courts have also attributed to
Congress an interest in protecting the individual. The Sherman Act m.as in-
tended, in the words of one court, to protect "the right of every individual to
36. See 21 CONG. REc. 2457-74, 2556-72, 2597-2616, 2639-62, 2901, 3145-53, 4033-4104
(1890).
37. In a case brought only a few years after the passage of the Sherman Act, it was
contended by the defendants that the act, being "aimed at monopoly of trade or commerce
by which trade should be engrossed, and in and by which property should be employed
and secured," was therefore not applicable in the instant case. The court, admitting that
the bill, as originally proposed in the Senate, "was directed wholly against trusts," never-
theless concluded that the Sherman Act had a broader applicability. United States v. Debs,
64 Fed. 724, 746-47 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894). The Supreme Court upheld the Circuit Court
on other grounds, but did not contradict the Circuit Court's views on the scope of the
Sherman Act. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 600 (1895). See also Loewe v. Lawlor, 203 U.S.
274 (1908).
38. "As a charter of freedom, the Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to
that found to be desirable in constitutional provisicns:' Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933). See also 21 CoNG. REc. 2461 (1890) (remarks of
Senator Sherman referring to the proposed bill as "a bill of rights, a charter of liberty").
See also Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
39. Although initially the Sherman Act was utilized as a means of prohibiting the
more obvious anti-competitive abuses of the large trusts, it eventually evolved into a means
of implementing a particular economic policy.
This change of emphasis from a negative (literally "anti-trust") approach to a
positive ("maintaining competition") aim ... has exerted a recognizable influence,
particularly in the most recent period, on the development of the case law and the
choice of suitable remedies.
NEALE, THE AxTrmusT LAws OF THE UNITED STATES oF AmcA 29 (1962).
40. It has been aptly stated that a combination constitutes a restraint of trade when
it "substituted control of the market for control by the market." STOCKING & VATKINS,
MONOPOLY AND FE ENTERPRISE 263 (1951).
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choose his own calling in life and to follow the trade of his choice unhampered
by any undue and unfair interference from others." 41 This concern undoubtedly
derives from common law doctrine which condemned restraints effected by
agreements to refrain from practicing a particular trade.42 An early Massa-
chusetts case 43 indicates the policies upon which these contracts were con-
demned:
1. Such contracts injure the parties making them, because they diminish
their means of procuring livelihoods and a competency for their
families....
2. They tend to deprive the public of the services of men in the employ-
ments and capacities in which they may be most useful to the com-
munity as well as themselves.
3. They discourage industry and enterprise, and diminish the products
of ingenuity and skill.44
Both the policies embodied in the Sherman Act and its application by the
courts therefore support the condemnation of all boycotts regardless of the
relationship of the victim to the boycotters.
4 5
The motion picture industry argues, however, that even assuming concerted
refusals to hire are encompassed by the Sherman Act, the Hollywood blacklist
should not be prohibited since its purpose is justifiable. Ostensibly the blacklist
was designed to restore the confidence of the public in the industry after the
congressional investigations,46 though it might also have been motivated in
41. United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 225 Fed. 800, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
42. It seems clear that the Sherman Act was intended to incorporate common law doc-
trine on restraints of trade. See, e.g., 21 CoNG. REc. 2456-61 (1890) ; Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51 (1911). For early condemnation of such agreements, see,
e.g., Dyer's Case, Y.B. Pasch. 2 Hen. 5, £ 5, pl. 26 (1415); Tailors of Ipswich, 11 Coke
53a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218, 1219 (KB. 1614). Later in the development of the common law
certain covenants in restraint of trade - those that were ancillary to the main purpose of
a lawful contract - were permitted. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85
Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
43. Alger v. Thacher, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 51 (1837).
44. Id. at 54.
45. The [Sherman Act] ... does not confine its protection to consumers, or to pur-
chasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. Nor does it immunize the outlawed acts
because they are done by any of these .... The Act is comprehensive in its terms
and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by
whomever they may be perpetrated.
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948).
46. In Young v. Motion Picture Ass'n, Inc., 28 F.R.D. 2 (D.D.C. 1961), Judge
Walsh, by way of dictum, declared that
... a fuller presentation of the facts in this case may indicate their actions do not
constitute a conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of the antitrust laws, but their
agreement was reasonable in view of the fact that the confidence of the public In
the motion picture industry had been placed in question as a result of the Congres-
sional investigations of the industry .... It may well be that here ... there is a
necessity to exhume insofar as possible any taint or stigma of Communist work-
manship on the motion pictures, etc., produced.
Id. at 6.
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part by a desire to bar Communist propaganda from the screen and to avoid
indirect subsidies to subversive organizations. 47 While these goals may be
desirable in themselves, Sherman Act precedent would appear to prohibit their
accomplishment by means of a concerted refusal to deal. The Supreme Court,
in considering boycotts, has consistently refused to inquire into the reason-
ableness of their purpose; in short, a per se rule has been established 8 In an
early Sherman Act decision the Court emphasized that the Sherman Act could
not
be evaded by good motives. The law is its own measure of right and
wrong, of what it permits, or forbids, and the judgment of the courts
cannot be set up against it in a supposed accommodation of its policy
with the good intention of parties, and it may be, of some good results.%
0
And in Fashion Originators' Guild the Court affirmed the refusal of the
Federal Trade Commission to hear evidence bearing on defendants' claim of
justification, stating that the unlawful combination could not
be justified upon the argument that systematic copying of dress designs
is itself tortious ... [for] even if copying were an acknowledged tort
under the law of every state, that situation would not justify petitioners
in combining together to regulate and restrain interstate commerce in
violation of federal law.50
An analysis of these cases applying the per se approach indicates that the
justifications offered in defense were all couched in terms of economic self-
interest. Several lower courts have apparently read the rejections of these
defenses as implicitly approving non-economic justifications of boycotts.5 ' Thus
in Council of Defense v. International Magawine Co.r2 the Court of Appeals
47. For further conjecture as to motives, see Horowitz, Legal Aspects of "Political
Blacklisting" in the Entertainment Industry, 29 So. CAL. L Rnv. 263, 264 (1956) ; Scuiu-
arAcH, THE FAcE oN THE Cun=G Room FwOOR 123 (1964). See also Coons, Non-Cam-
inercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L, REv. 705, 754 (1962).
48. Commentators have generally agreed that while some lower courts have attempted
to fashion certain justifiable circumstances in which boycotts would not be illegal, the
Supreme Court, especially in its Klor's decision, has made it clear that boycotts are illegal
per se and cannot be justified. See Handler, Recent Developments in Anlitrust Law:
1958-1959, 59 Col.uar. L. REv. 843, 862 (1959); Oppenheim, Selected Antitrust Develop-
meits in the Courts and Federal Trade Commission during the Past Year, 15 A.B.A.
A=Rusr SEcroi 37, 54 (1959) ; Loevinger, Rule of Reason in Anti-trust Law, 7 P.Ac.
LAw. 17 (Nov. 1961). See also dicta supporting the doctrine of per se illegality of group
boycotts in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (195); Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953) ; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
B. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1948). But see Rahl, Per So Rules and Boy-
cotts Under the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on the Klor's Case, 45 V. L. Rsv. 1165
(1959).
49. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912), quoted in
Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 44 (1930).
50. 312 U.S. at 468.
51. See, e.g., Hughes Tool Co. v. Motion Picture Ass'n, 66 F. Supp. 1006, 1013 (S.D.
N.Y. 1946), discussed in Coons, supra note 47, at 745-46.
52. 267 Fed. 390 (8th Cir. 1920), discussed in Coons, supra note 47, at 742-44.
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for the Eighth Circuit, although holding a boycott by newsdealers of magazines
published by the International Magazine Company illegal, indicated in dicta
that a non-economic purpose might be a valid defense under other circum-
stances. The boycott was designed to protect the citizens of New Mexico
during World War I from the allegedly un-American and pro-German views
of William Randolph Hearst, the magazine company's largest stockholder.
Although the court held this particular boycott illegal under the Sherman Act,
its emphasis on the failure to show that any of Hearst's objectionable views
appeared in the boycotted magazines may imply that a boycott of magazines
actually containing those views would have been upheld. More recently, in
Molinas v. National Basketball Association 53 the District Court for the
Southern District of New York upheld a concerted refusal to hire a basketball
player suspended for having bet on his own team in violation of the associa-
tion's rule, stating that such restraint was not illegal because "a disciplinary
rule invoked against gambling seems about as reasonable a rule as could be
imagined.
' '54
While these lower court cases may be read to support the conclusion that
the Supreme Court's per se approach is confined to economic-purpose boy-
cotts, the Supreme Court itself has indicated a contrary understanding. In
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange " the respondent Exchange, by joint
action of its members, discontinued the private wire connection of petitioner,
a non-member security dealer. The Exchange refused to disclose to Silver the
reasons for its action, but later revealed in pre-trial hearings that it was moti-
vated at least partially by the suspension of Silver's security clearance by the
53. 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
54. Id. at 244. The Molinas-type boycott - instituted by a sports league or profes-
sional association - is in any event distinguishable from the fact situation presented by
the Hollywood blacklist. In Molinas, or, for example, in a refusal by the American Medical
Association to admit chiropractors to membership, there is a pre-existent, valid joint ven-
ture or arrangement, to which the restraint is, in a meaningful sense, ancillary, In the
case of the Hollywood blacklist, however, the motion picture producers have come to-
gether for only one purpose - the boycott itself. A joint venture has been defined as
a group which undertakes an economically productive activity in concert in order
to overcome the impracticability of any one member's amassing sufficient capital for
the project or in order to eliminate the economic waste involved in duplication of
effort.
Note, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 71 HARV. L. Rv.
1531, 1536 (1958); see KAYSEN & TURNER, ATITRUST PoucY 136-41 (1959). It can be
argued that a refusal to deal, when incidental to or in furtherance of the valid main pur-
pose of a joint venture, should not be considered, for purposes of the Sherman Act, a group
boycott, whose sole purpose or effect is to restrain trade.
One type of group boycott which probably should be outside the scope of the Sherman
Act is the consumer boycott, because it presumably reflects the play of market forces which
that act meant to preserve. One commentator has attempted to distinguish between con-
sumer boycotts which impose restrictions and those whose ultimate goal is to remove re-
strictions - Marcus, Civil Rights and the Antitrust Laws, 18 U. Ci. L. REv. 171, 215
(1951) - but this distinction seems tenuous at best.
55. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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Department of Defense some six years before. 6 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, did not even refer to the purpose, stating that
It is plain.., that removal of the wires by collective action of the Ex-
change and its members would, had it occurred in a context free from
other federal regulation, have constituted a per se violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Act. The concerted action of the Exchange and its mem-
bers here was, in simple terms, a group boycott depriving petitioners of
a valuable business service which they needed in order to compete effec-
tively as broker-dealers in the over-the-counter securities market 7
Disposing of the case on grounds of the relationship between the Securities
Exchange Act and the Sherman Act, the Court indicated that, absent con-
gressional exemption removing boycotts from the scope of the Sherman Act,"
all boycotts are illegal per se.
This understanding is consistent with a fundamental tenet of American
political and social thought reflected in part in the Sherman Act. 9 The fear of
concentration of economic power in private hands, enabling a private group to
exercise powers comparable to a government without the public responsibility
inherent in representative government, has long been a part of American polit-
ical philosophy and rhetoric.60 One of the purposes consistently attributed to
the antitrust laws was to retain governing power in the hands of politically
responsible persons."' Senator Sherman himself believed that such private con-
centration of economic power was alien to our democratic constitution and was
as much a tyranny as concentration of political power.6 2 Justice Douglas, more
than fifty years after the enactment of the Sherman Act, echoed this same
sentiment:
[S]ize in steel is the measure of the power of a handful of men over
our economy... The philosophy of the Sherman Act is that it should
56. 196 F. Supp. 209, 216-17, 226 (1961). The district court pointed out that this sus-
pension was under the Industrial Personnel Security Program later held unlawful and
void by the Supreme Court in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). 196 F. Supp.
at 226.
57. 373 U.S. at 347.
58. See, e.g., 59 Stat 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1958), which specifically exempts
the business of insurance from the scope of the Sherman Act where such business is
regulated by state law. Of course, the fact that Congress has passed legislation regulating
or penalizing Communists in other areas cannot justify an implication that private con-
certed action against Communists is exempted thereby from the antitrust laws. 'It is a
cardinal principle of construction that repeals by implication are not favored." United
States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
59. See generally THOREILI, THE FEDnniL, Ahm-usr Povrcy (1954).
60. See, e.g., Cu-ri, TH Gow'rH o AimcAw THOUGHT 611 (2d ed. 1951);
AnAa s, THE THEORY OF SociAL REvoLwoNs 203-10 (1913).
61. See, e.g, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428-29 (1945).
'Tower to exclude someone from trade, to regulate prices, to determine what shall be
produced, is governing power, whether exercised by public officials or by private groups.
In a democracy, such powers are entrusted only to elected representatives of the gov-
erned .. . !' Schwartz, The Schwartz Dissent, 1 Ain=musr BuLL. 37, 39 (1955). See
EDwARDS, BIG Busnmss Am THE POLICY OF Cossn'rMoN 1, 2, 4 (1956).
62. See 21 CoNG. Ruc. 2457 (1890) (remarks of Senator Sherman).
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not exist. For all power tends to develop into a government in itself,
Power that controls the economy should be in the hands of elected repre-
sentatives of the people, not in the hands of an industrial oligarchy. In-
dustrial power should be decentralized. It should be scattered into many
hands so that the fortunes of the people will not be dependent on the whim
or caprice, the political prejudices, the emotional stability of a few self-
appointed men.... That is the philosophy and the command of the Sher-
man Act. It is founded on the theory of hostility to the concentration in
private hands of power so great that only a government of the people
should have it.63
In the history of Sherman Act adjudication no practice has been more con-
sistently condemned on the basis of this philosophy than concerted refusals to
deal. As one court typically stated:
It is not a prerogative of private parties... to install themselves as judges
and guardians of the public welfare, and to enforce by drastic and restric-
tive measures their conceptions thus formed. 4
Moreover, in Fashion Originators' Guild the Supreme Court suggested that
even though the boycott was aimed only at allegedly tortious conduct,
The combination is in reality an extra-governmental agency, which pre-
scribes rules for the regulation and restraint of interstate commerce, and
provides extra-judicial tribunals for determination and punishment of
violations, and thus "trenches upon the power of the national legislature
and violates the statute."6
5
And it would seem that this hostility to the concentration of economic power
in pirivate hands is as applicable to the Hollywood blacklist as to the boycotts
generally condemned by the courts. The motion picture producers, in agreeing
to bar "subversive" writers and actors from the industry, have not only inter-
fered with the right of an individual to pursue "his own calling," but have
also made the decisions, normally left to the consumer, regarding who should
be allowed to provide products and services for the public 00 and which in-
tellectual and artistic values are to prevail. 7 While the individual's right to
hire the writers and actors he pleases regardless of merit is generally pro-
-61. United States v. Columbia Steel Col, 334 U.S. 49 , 536 (1948) (dissenting opinion)
(emphasis added).
64. FTC v. Wallace, 75 F2d 733, 737 (1935). See also American Medical Ass'n v.
United States, 130 F..2d 233, 249 (1942), aff'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
65. 312 U.S. at 465. See also Kirkpatrick, Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations
of the Sherman Act, 10- GEo. WASn. L. Rv. 302, 387, 400 (1942).
66. One commentator has analogized a boycott to a "licensing system" imposed by
private groups f6r private purposes. "The boycotting parties determine who shall enter,
who shall'remain in, and "who shall be eccluded from a field of economic activity." Hand-
ler, Recent Developments in Antitrust Law: 1958-1959, 59 CoLuz. L. REv. 843, 864
(1959).;
67." Sde ScHumAcH, THE FAcE bN THE CTTIG Room1 FLOOR 138-40 (1964), for the
thesis that one of the results of the blacklist was the stunting of Hollywood'9 intellectual
and artistic growth. It has been suggested that one of the functions of the antitrust laws Is




tected,63 what may be permissible conduct by one employer cannot be justified
when the denial of economic opportunity is the result of concerted industry-
wide agreement For absent such agreement the forces of competition would
presumably provide a writer or actor whose services were desired by the
public with an offer of employment from a producer more strongly profit-
oriented.69 It is exactly this interference with market forces which the Sher-
man Act was intended to prevent. In spite of this philosophy and the courts'
general adherence to it through a per se approach to boycotts, the producers
claim that an exception should be created when the boycotts involved are
-aimed at "desirable" moral, political or social goals. But the commitment to
a decentralized economic system and the free operation of market forces re-
quires that all such practices be prohibited regardless of purpose. The Sher-
man Act, moreover, is not an invitation to de novo judgments by courts as to
the desirability of the goals sought to be achieved by anticompetitive practices.
In a system based on the balancing of powers, it is not for the courts, in
interpreting legislation, to revise the congressional judgment by creating ex-
ceptions to it on the basis of what is thought to be "desirable" or "undesir-
able." 70 If it is desirable to take the extreme step of excluding disloyal persons
from the entire entertainment industry, such exclusion should be accomplished
as a result of a politically responsible decision made through the legislative
68. See Comment, Loyalty and Private Employment: The Right of Employers to
Discharge Suspected Subversives, 62 YAE UJ. 954 (1953).
69. Evidence that, absent the agreement, some members of the industry would not have
refused to employ the blacklisted writers can be found in the existence of the widespread
and complex black market system for obtaining scripts. See SCHU*.ACH, TnE FACE orU
THE CUTTING Room FLooR 130-40 (1964), for a description of the ways in which this
black market operates.
A further indication of the restraint imposed by the blacklist on the executives of
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, who would have acted differently absent such agreement, is found
in Cole v. Loew's, Inc., 8 FR.D. 508 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
Here is an unusual situation, where an employee, who has given satisfaction to his
employers - whom they actually want, and whom ... even now they do not wish
to let go . . . - a man of this character was suspended and kept without a salary
for over a year to satisfy, not a deep conviction of his employers, - but a policy
which the employers adopted, along with others in the industry.
8 F.R.D. at 526-27. See also note 4 supra and accompanying text.
The coercive effect of the combination on the individual producer, restraining his free-
dom of action as to his own employment practices, eliminates any opportunity for the
employee to bargain with the producers individually. It would appear that individual em-
ployers could adequately protect their own interests without the necessity of concerted
action. For the questions raised as to the desirability (apart from the antitrust laws) of
permitting concerted action if it can be shown that there is an "industry" interest rather
than, or in addition to, the interests of the individuals in the industry, which can only be
protected by combined action, see Horowitz, Legal Aspects of "Political Blacklisting in
the Entertainment Industry, 29 So. Cu. L. Rnv. 263, 269-70 & n.19 (1956).
70. Compare the unhappy experience in the field of labor law, where the courts in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries attempted to draw distinctions on an ad hoc
case by case basis between acceptable and unacceptable labor practices, thus making law
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process,71 and not by ad hoc judicial decisions or by concerted action of private
individuals. Only by condemning boycotts regardless of "justifiable" purpose
can the courts fulfill their proper function of effectuating the fundamental
philosophy incorporated in the broad proscriptions of the Sherman Act -
the prevention of the existence and use of vast economic power in the hands
of private parties.
without sufficient standards or guides for decisions. "[The judges] drew lines on the basih
of hunch and prejudice and accordingly they brought chaos to the bargaining process and
disrepute to the judicial process." Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the
Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547, 1554 (1963).
See Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Stand-
ards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 30-38 (1963).
71. Of course, serious questions might be raised as to the constitutionality of such a
law.
